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Combatting Fake News: Alternatives to Limiting




The continued expansion and development of the Internet has generated
a malicious side effect: social media intermediaries such as Facebook and
Google permit the dispersion of third-party generated fake news and misin-
formation. While the term “fake news” tends to shift in definition, it most
frequently denotes blatantly false information posted on the Internet intended
to sway opinion.1 The social and political implications for this trend have
become radical, as shown by the shooting at the Comet Ping Pong restaurant
in Washington D.C. in early December 2016.2 Social media websites have
been able to avert legal responsibility for this phenomenon—the First
Amendment, along with the Communications Decency Act, create strong
barriers to statutory or judicial regulation of this harmful journalistic trend.3
Despite showing signs of concern for this issue, Facebook in particular con-
tinues to insist on their “technology company” label, even though the social
media outlet remains a major source for news and media.4
This comment will discuss the decline in the primacy of traditional jour-
nalism and the countervailing rise in problematic fake news and misinforma-
tion disseminated through social media intermediaries. The comment will
begin by exploring the development of the Fourth and Fifth Estates, tradi-
tional means of addressing harmful journalism, and the background of the
Communications Decency Act. Next, this comment will discuss the current
state of the law surrounding the Communications Decency Act as it applies
* Dallas Flick is a 2018 candidate for a Juris Doctor from SMU Dedman School
of Law. He received a Bachelor of Science in Political Science and Speech
Communications from the University of Texas in Tyler in 2015.
1. See, e.g., Danielle Kurtzleben, With ‘Fake News,’ Trump Moves from Alterna-
tive Facts to Alternative Language, NPR (Feb. 17, 2017, 8:27 PM), http://www
.npr.org/2017/02/17/515630467/with-fake-news-trump-moves-from-alterna-
tive-facts-to-alternative-language.
2. Kevin Bohn et al., Gun-Brandishing Man Sought to Investigate Fake News
Story Site, Policy Say, CNN (Dec. 5, 2016, 2:48 PM), http://www.cnn.com/
2016/12/04/politics/gun-incident-fake-news/.
3. See infra Part II.C.
4. Catherine Buni, Facebook Won’t Call Itself a Media Company. Is it Time to
Reimagine Journalism for the Digital Age?, THE VERGE (Nov. 16, 2016, 4:25
PM), http://www.theverge.com/2016/11/16/13655102/facebook-journalism-
ethics-media-company-algorithm-tax; see also Daisuke Wakabayashi & Mike
Issac, In Race Against Fake News, Google and Facebook Stroll to the Starting
Line, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/25/tech-
nology/google-facebook-fake-news.html.
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to social media intermediaries. After looking to the social, legal, and eco-
nomic considerations for each aspect of this issue, this comment will con-
sider two alternative solutions for this issue: (1) a modification of the
standard of scrutiny for statutes seeking to regulate fake news and misinfor-
mation; and (2) a nominal levy on large digital intermediaries to cross-subsi-
dize quality journalism. As will be discussed below, policymakers and the
judiciary should prioritize indirect or external solutions to reducing fake
news and misinformation to restore the integrity of the Fourth and Fifth Es-
tates, while at the same time ensuring the continued, healthy development of
the Internet and social media intermediaries.
II. LEGAL AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
A. Development of the Fourth and Fifth Estates
The press, along with ancillary forms of journalism and media, has long
embodied the “Fourth Estate,“ an important element of developing and con-
temporary societies worldwide.5 In the United States, the legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial branches of government embody the first three estates.6 In
theory, the Fourth Estate operates independently from the other three estates,
as well as other significant business and industry institutions.7 Independence
ensures press integrity “to investigate, report on, and bring to public attention
the activity of other institutions . . . .”8 The press and mass media hold these
institutions accountable by reporting on their activities, thereby becoming a
political force for improved, pluralistic governance.9
Traditionally, the Fourth Estate comprises of print journalism10 largely
unencumbered by political party affiliation, thus cultivating less biased and
more independent news reporting.11 More recently, however, large media
corporations maintaining a substantial portion of the global media market
5. William H. Dutton, The Fifth Estate Emerging Through the Network of Net-
works, 27 PROMETHEUS 1, 1–2 (2009).
6. Id. at 2.
7. Nic Newman et al., Social Media in the Changing Ecology of News: The
Fourth and Fifth Estates in Britain, 7 INT’L J. INT. SCI. 6, 6–7 (2012).
8. Id. at 7.
9. See id.
10. Id.
11. See Matthew Gentzkow et al., The Rise of the Fourth Estate: How Newspapers
Became Informative and Why It Mattered, in CORRUPTION AND REFORM: LES-
SONS FROM AMERICA’S ECONOMIC HISTORY 187, 190, 195 (Edward L. Glaeser
& Claudia Goldin eds., 2006) (measuring the post-Civil War decrease in news-
paper partisan affiliation and the subsequent reduction in biased reporting and
partisan content).
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share mutated the Fourth Estate.12 These large corporations raise concerns
regarding their ability to report the news free of bias or concern for personal
profit.13 The threat of excessive monopoly power creates a risk of decline in
the creation and preservation of virtuous forms of journalism, as priorities
shift from credibility of message to media branding and financial
credibility.14
The Information Age established the “Fifth Estate,” which possesses
similar characteristics to the Fourth Estate, but with more focus on the grow-
ing use of information communication technologies that manifest novel
means of peer-to-peer connectivity.15 This level of connectivity permits in-
creased fluidity of information transfer, thus opening more ways to keep in-
stitutions of power accountable.16 These new mediums include social media
websites such as Facebook and Twitter, which offer mechanisms of directly
expressing public opinion independent of any single institution.17 Fourth Es-
tate mass media may amplify Fifth Estate content (and vice versa), and in
doing so, it can fulfill the same functions of holding government and busi-
ness activities in a public light.18 If, however, this content bypasses the
Fourth Estate and lacks centralized accountability, the Fifth Estate could eas-
ily undermine Fourth Estate traditional journalism through the reinforcement
of individual prejudices in “echo chambers” that manifest from selective ex-
posure to unmediated and unsubstantiated news and information.19
B. Traditional Defamation Law
Despite First Amendment protections for freedom of the press,20 the tort
of defamation remains preserved to protect the reputation and dignity of each
individual American citizen.21 Defamatory communication “tends . . . to
harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the com-
12. Shaun Docherty, Media Discourse During the Financial Crisis: An Inquiry into




14. See Justin Schlosberg, The Mission of Media in an Age of Monopoly, RESPUB-
LICA 1–2 (2016).
15. Dutton, supra note 5, at 2–3.
16. Id. at 17.
17. See id.; Newman et al., supra note 7, at 7.
18. Newman et al., supra note 7, at 7 (discussing the higher diversity in sources of
information from local and global sources of journalism).
19. See id.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
21. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (quoting Rosenblatt
v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring)); Melissa A. Troiano,
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munity or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.”22
Liability for defamatory statements extends beyond publishers when an en-
tity has a significant role in their publication or when the entity allows the
continued publication in a medium under their control.23 Defamation law dis-
tinguishes primary publishers from distributors and common carriers when
determining liability for defamatory content found in print media and infor-
mation technologies.24 Primary publishers, such as authors or newspaper edi-
tors, are wholly liable for published defamatory statements because of their
constructive editorial knowledge of the material in question.25 Distributors,
such as bookstores and newsstands, have less editorial control and only
maintain liability for defamatory content they had reasonable knowledge of
prior to publication.26 Common carriers, such as telephone companies, facili-
tate the dissemination of defamatory statements, and thus have no editorial
control to establish liability.27 Defamation claims involving traditional media
sources allow for a rigid categorization of liability between primary publish-
ers and distributors, but lines blur when considering evolving Internet com-
munication technologies and novel means of creating and disseminating
potentially harmful content.28
C. The Communications Decency Act
The advent and development of social media interactivity created a me-
dium for information sharing much larger and more fluid than traditional
forms of media and journalism.29 This presented a litany of new legal issues
concerning the obligations of website operators facilitating this information
sharing, and the novel nature of this interconnectivity precluded a court con-
The New Journalism? Why Traditional Defamation Laws Should Apply to In-
ternet Blogs, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1447, 1451 (2006).
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: DEFAMATORY COMM. DEFINED § 559
(1977).
23. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: WHAT CONSTITUTES PUBLICATION
§ 577 (1977).
24. See Troiano, supra note 21, at 1453.
25. See id.; Stephanie Blumstein, The New Immunity in Cyberspace: The Expanded
Reach of the Communications Decency Act to the Libelous “Re-Poster”, 9
B.U.J. SCI & TECH. L. 407, 409–10 (2003).
26. See Troiano, supra note 21, at 1453.
27. See id.
28. See Brian J. McBrearty, Who’s Responsible? Website Immunity Under the
Communications Decency Act and the Partial Creation or Development of On-
line Content, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 827, 830 (2009).
29. See Michelle Jee, New Technology Merits New Interpretation: An Analysis of
the Breadth of CDA Section 230 Immunity, 13 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 178,
183–84 (2003).
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sensus on how to address defamation claims against these new in-
termediaries.30 In an attempt to regulate speech and other potentially harmful
content on the Internet, in 1995, Senator James Exon of Nebraska introduced
the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA).31 The intent of the CDA
was to prevent minors from observing obscene or indecent content online,32
and it sought to enhance government regulation over the Internet during its
initial boon in the United States.33
Section 230 of the CDA (Section 230) was Congress’s response to two
conflicting decisions arising out of New York courts.34 In Cubby, Inc. v.
CompuServe, Inc., CompuServe used third-party information to post a tab-
loid on one of its special interest forums, and the plaintiff sued CompuServe
for libel for statements contained in the posting.35 The court utilized tradi-
tional defamation doctrine to classify CompuServe as a distributor, thus
shielding them from liability for the third-party posting.36 If CompuServe
neither knew, nor had reason to know, of the third-party defamatory state-
ments, it could not be liable.37 Determinative in this case was CompuServe’s
lack of editorial control, as the court compared the service to a library or
newsstand, thus allowing a lower liability standard.38 In contrast, the Su-
preme Court of New York in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.
held the defendant Prodigy liable for defamation claims similar to those
presented in Cubby, Inc.39 In Stratton, because the website maintained suffi-
cient editorial control of a bulletin board’s contents, it was designated a pub-
lisher and maintained liability.40 The court’s conclusion shifted from the
30. See id.
31. Robert Cannon, The Legislative History of Senator Exon’s Communications
Decency Act: Regulating Barbarians on the Information Superhighway, 49
FED. COMM. L.J. 51, 52–53 (1996)
32. CDA Legislative History, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/
cda230/legislative-history (last visited Feb. 1, 2018).
33. See Cannon, supra note 31, at 53.
34. See CDA Legislative History, supra note 32.
35. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 138 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Jee,
supra note 29, at 184.
36. See Cubby, Inc., 776 F. Supp. at 139–40 (rejecting strict liability on distributors
under the First and Fourteenth Amendment for the contents of the reading ma-
terial they carry).
37. Id. at 141.
38. McBrearty, supra note 28, at 831.
39. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 1995 WL 323710, at *1 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995); see Cubby, Inc., 776 F. Supp. at 137–38.
40. Stratton, 1995 WL 323710, at *5 (noting that Prodigy committed to controlling
the content on their website and used screening software to enforce their con-
tent standards).
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traditional liability standard noted in Cubby, Inc. and instead used the level
of editorial control as the metric for publisher liability.41 According to this
decision, a company with a website or any other source of information on the
Internet would need to avoid all moderating of content to avoid liability.42
In response to the Stratton decision, Representatives Chris Cox and Ron
Wyden introduced an amendment to the CDA, which would become Section
230.43 Congress enacted the provision to avoid a chilling effect on Internet
growth caused by disincentives to self-regulation spawned by the Stratton
decision.44 Congress enacted Section 230’s immunity for interactive service
providers to “remove disincentives for the development and utilization of
blocking and filtering technologies that . . . restrict . . . access to objectiona-
ble or inappropriate online material.”45 It also sought to encourage the unfet-
tered and unregulated development of Internet free speech and e-commerce.46
Thus, Section 230 precludes the imposition of liability on an interactive com-
puter service provider (ICSP) for its use of editorial and self-regulatory
functions.47
Section 230(c) of the CDA states: “No provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any informa-
tion provided by another information content provider.”48 This provision es-
tablishes federal immunity to any cause of action that would make interactive
service providers liable for information originating from a third-party user.49
Section 230 provides immunity contingent on the following conditions: (1)
the party seeking immunity is a “provider or user of an interactive computer
service”; (2) the claim treats the party seeking immunity “as the publisher or
speaker” of the disputed content; and (3) the claim is based on content pro-
duced “by another information content provider.”50
An interactive computer service is “[a]ny information service, system,
or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by mul-
tiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system
41. See id.; see also McBrearty, supra note 28, at 831.
42. CDA Legislative History, supra note 32.
43. Id.
44. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997).
45. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4) (1998); see also CDA Legislative History, supra note 32
(noting the demise of the anti-indecency sections of the CDA in 1997 and the
survival of Section 230).
46. Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2003).
47. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331.
48. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (1998).
49. Id.; Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.
50. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (1998).
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that provides access to the Internet . . . .”51 Courts have broadly interpreted
interactive computer services to include Internet providers and Internet-re-
lated services.52 Section 230 provides immunity only where a plaintiff treats
an ICSP as the publisher of the content at issue.53 A claim under Section 230
must demonstrate that the allegedly problematic content originates from a
third-party information content provider,54 which the statute defines as “any
person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or
development of information provided through the Internet or any other inter-
active computer service.”55 The reference in Section 230(c) to content pro-
duced by “another information content provider” demonstrates that providers
cannot claim immunity when an action arises out of content the ICSP itself
produced.56 Section 230 also permits claims for joint liability for joint devel-
opment of problematic content.57
Courts follow the plain language of Section 230 to establish broad
boundaries for the immunity applied to ICSPs.58 First, Section 230(c) immu-
nizes an ICSP exercising a publisher’s traditional editorial functions, such as
to publish, withdraw, postpone, or alter disputed content.59 This broad provi-
51. Id. § 230(f)(2).
52. See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003) (including a listserv
email newsletter sent by a website operator within the definition of interactive
computer service); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 n.2 (concluding that America Online
fell within the definition of interactive service provider); Carafano v. Metros-
plash.com, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1065–66 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff’d on
other grounds, 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a matchmaking and
dating website is an interactive computer service); see also McBrearty, supra
note 28, at 832.
53. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (1998).
54. Id.
55. Id. § 230(f)(3).
56. Id. § 230(c); McBrearty, supra note 28, at 833; see also Anthony v. Yahoo
Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1262–63 (N.D. Cal. 2006), aff’d, 376 Fed. Appx.
775 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding § 230(c) immunity inapplicable to Yahoo where it
generated false profiles on its dating website and emailed profiles of expired
members to current members).
57. Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 50 (D.D.C. 1998).
58. Rachel Seaton, All Crimes are Not Created Equal: Challenging the Breadth of
Immunity Granted by the Communications Decency Act, 6 SETON HALL CIR-
CUIT REV. 355, 362–63 (2010) (discussing the holding of Zeran and subsequent
case law advancing a broad interpretation of immunity under 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(c)); see McBrearty, supra note 28, at 834.
59. See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he exclusion of
‘publisher’ liability necessarily precludes liability for exercising the usual pre-
rogative of publishers to choose among proffered material and to edit the mate-
rial published while retaining its basic form and message.”).
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sion of immunity garners support from Congress’s stated goal of continued
development of the Internet and other interactive media, while also minimiz-
ing government regulation over these new mediums of communication.60 In
furtherance of these policy goals, courts also extend Section 230(c) immunity
to ICSPs that abstain from acting on their knowledge of offensive content on
their websites.61 This immunity also covers interactive computer services
providing neutral tools to users to post potentially harmful content.62 Courts
split on whether an exception for immunity exists in instances where interac-
tive computer services induce questionable—or illegal—content and infor-
mation.63 While some courts maintain the breadth of Section 230 immunity
for ICSPs, others withhold immunity from services that materially contribute
to the creation or dissemination of problematic content.64 The Ninth Circuit
in Roommates.com justified a broadened definition of contributory action by
noting the Internet no longer operates as a fragile new means of communica-
tion, but rather is the dominant means in which communication occurs; thus,
its under-regulation and provision of broad, uncompromising immunity may
be outdated.65
60. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1) (“It is the policy of the United States . . . to promote
the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer ser-
vices and other interactive media.”); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327,
330–31 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting the intention of Congress in enacting 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(c) to reduce government regulation over the Internet); Blumenthal, 992
F. Supp. at 49 (noting the breadth of immunity to compensate for the higher
speed and volume of informational exchange on the Internet and the difficulty
of its regulation).
61. See Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 420 (1st Cir.
2007); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332–33 (indicating that liability upon notice leads to
service providers restricting speech and abstaining from self-regulation).
62. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d
1157, 1174 n.37 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“Providing neutral tools for navigat-
ing websites is fully protected by CDA immunity, absent substantial affirma-
tive conduct on the part of the website creator promoting the use of such tools
for unlawful purposes.”); see also Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d
1119, 1124–25 (9th Cir. 2003) (permitting 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) immunity for a
dating website that utilized a specialized questionnaire because the third party
willingly provides the essential published content).
63. McBrearty, supra note 28, at 841–42.
64. Compare Chi. Lawyers Comm. for Civil Rights under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist,
Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding the exception for content in-
ducement incompatible with the concept of 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) immunity), and
Lycos, 478 F.3d at 420 (upholding 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) immunity for an interac-
tive content service that made it marginally easier for third-party development
and dissemination of misinformation), with Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at
1167–68 (holding that an interactive computer service’s publication of a de-
famatory statement “materially contributes” to its unlawfulness).
65. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1164 n.15.
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Several policy considerations underpin the continued deployment of im-
munity under Section 230 of the CDA.66 As previously discussed, the legisla-
tive intent buttressing the provision of immunity is the continued
development of the Internet as a means of peer-to-peer connectivity without
the burdens of government regulation.67 Tangential to this development is the
promotion of the Internet free market, which includes competition for news
and information sharing.68 This advancement improves the development and
dissemination of news and information, as well as the means of control over
what information individuals receive.69 Courts recognized the possibilities
for the Internet’s advancement and thus sought to remove the disincentives
for the continued development of interactive computer services.70 The histor-
ical development of the CDA establishes the norm of protecting ICSPs, and
the justification for this protection remains with the proliferation of contem-
porary websites and other sources of news and information.71
III. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
A. CDA Applicability to Social Media Intermediaries
Contemporary growth of the Internet and interactive computer services
results in the reapplication of Section 230 of the CDA to a wide variety of
new communication applications.72 To retain the same protections given to
content at the outset of the Internet’s development, courts broadly construe
Section 230 protections to include social media websites and other digital
intermediaries, thus granting immunity to their permissive stance toward po-
66. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (1998).
67. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
68. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(1) (“The rapidly developing array of Internet and other
interactive computer services available to individual Americans represent an
extraordinary advance in the availability of educational and informational re-
sources to our citizens.”); id. § 230(b)(2) (“It is the policy of the United States
. . . to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for
the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or
State regulation . . . .”).
69. Id. § 230(b)(3) (“[T]o encourage the development of technologies which maxi-
mize user control over what information is received by individuals, families,
and schools who use the Internet and other interactive computer services[.]”).
70. See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) (discussing
the necessity of immunity for ICSPs to stymie the intrusive threat of tort-based
lawsuits on freedom of speech in the new Internet marketplace); Jee, supra
note 29, at 185–86.
71. See Jee, supra note 29, at 195–96.
72. See Alfred C. Weaver & Benjamin B. Morrison, Social Networking, 41 COM-
PUTER 97, 97 (2008).
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tentially harmful fake news and misinformation.73 Social media platforms
typically qualify as interactive computer services because they “provide[ ]
information to ‘multiple users’ by giving them ‘computer access . . . to a
computer server’ . . . namely the servers that host [their] social networking
website[s].”74 These platforms provide applications that permit users to cre-
ate and develop their own content, rather than solely access the content de-
veloped by websites alone.75 The service’s capability to control or remove
content posted on their social media website does not void its immunity.76 As
with earlier rulings on the applicability of Section 230, establishing liability
for the self-policing of content creates a chilling effect on ICSPs’ willingness
to regulate and improve their content.77 Thus, even though Facebook, Twit-
ter, and other social media intermediaries have the ability to remove harmful
content on their websites from public consumption, their protection under the
CDA remains intact.78
Plaintiffs bringing claims against social media websites such as
Facebook rarely successfully contest the status of interactive computer ser-
vice as defined by the CDA.79 Instead, plaintiffs may attempt to challenge the
immunity provision by arguing that the social media websites operate as both
interactive computer services and information content providers.80 Establish-
ing liability requires proof that the social media website had full or partial
responsibility for the creation or development of the harmful content in ques-
tion.81 For instance, the court in Perkins v. Linkedin Corp. found that a pro-
fessional networking service’s excessive sending of networking invitation
emails went beyond that of the traditional editorial functions typically pro-
73. See Doe v. MySpace, Inc. (MySpace, Inc. II), 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir.
2008); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir.
2003).
74. Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting 47
U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (2012)).
75. Jee, supra note 29, at 196.
76. Klayman, 753 F.3d at 1358.
77. Id.; see Jee, supra note 29, at 184–85; see also supra note 61 and accompany-
ing text.
78. See Klayman, 753 F.3d at 1357–58.
79. See, e.g., id. at 1358 (“[Plaintiff] does not seriously dispute that Facebook
meets the statutory definition of an interactive computer service . . . .”); MyS-
pace, Inc. II, 528 F.3d 413, 419 (5th Cir. 2008) (“The [plaintiffs] appear to
agree with the consensus among courts regarding the liability provisions in
§ 230(c)(1).”).
80. See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521
F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“A website operator can be both a
service provider and a content provider . . . .”).
81. Id.
2017] Combatting Fake News 385
tected by Section 230 of the CDA.82 The plaintiffs did not dispute the “inter-
active computer service” denotation, but successfully argued that the nature
of its emails and content dissemination also establishes it as an information
content provider, thus precluding immunity under Section 230 of the CDA.83
The court, agreeing with the plaintiffs, noted the excessive use of emails with
the names and likenesses of the plaintiffs as personalized endorsement of its
interactive computer service went beyond that of passive publication, and
therefore concluded that the true authorship and publication of the informa-
tion lay with Linkedin.84
Decisions regarding the applicability of Section 230 to social media in-
termediaries reflect a limited withholding of immunity claims of harmful
third-party content; they use original interpretations of the CDA to give
broad immunity to new varieties of ICSPs. For instance, the court in Anthony
v. Yahoo! Inc. withheld immunity from Yahoo! when the website would gen-
erate false dating profiles to send to users to increase confidence in its online
dating services.85 The court held that the CDA does not preclude misrepre-
sentation and fraud claims against ICSPs that knowingly generate and main-
tain harmful content on their websites.86 Similarly, in Fair Housing Council
of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, the Ninth Circuit precluded
immunity for a roommate connectivity website designed to force users to
provide personal characteristics and discriminatory preferences in a question-
naire in order to find a preferable roommate.87 In both cases, the courts
lacked novel interpretations of Section 230 to apply to new social media
websites, as compared to other forms of interactive computer services.
Rather than provide a helpful reinterpretation for a new line of services, the
courts retrofitted the original provision to their rulings, thus keeping static
the broad applicability of ICSP immunity.
The urge to uphold the original policy justifications of Section 230 re-
mains unchanged despite the stark rise in the dissemination of harmful con-
tent through social media intermediaries.88 Technological modernity makes
broad applicability of Section 230 immunity under the CDA less imperative
82. See Perkins v. Linkedin Corp., 53 F. Supp. 3d 1222, 1247–48 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
83. See id. (citing Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1165).
84. Id.
85. Anthony v. Yahoo! Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1259–60, 1262 (N.D. Cal.
2006), aff’d, 376 Fed. Appx. 775 (9th Cir. 2010).
86. Id. at 1262–63 (citing Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 50 (D.D.C.
1998)).
87. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1164, 1169–70.
88. See Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1358 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Carafano
v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003); Zeran v. Am.
Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330–31 (4th Cir. 1997).
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as during the early development of the Internet.89 Despite the lack of immedi-
ate necessity for this focus, courts remain afflicted by policy-based tunnel
vision when considering the application of CDA immunity to a website. For
example, the court in Dart v. Craigslist, Inc. held that Craigslist was entitled
to immunity regardless of the plaintiff’s complaint that the website makes
solicitation and prostitution permissible on their classified advertisement
pages.90 The court rejected the plaintiff’s arguments purporting Craigslist’s
knowledge of their website’s available prostitution91 and non-neutral tools
that connected users to prostitutes and brothels.92 In another instance, the
Northern District Court of Ohio in Doe v. SexSearch granted immunity to the
provider of an adult dating online service, thus rejecting plaintiff’s arguments
that SexSearch was an information content provider that altered and deleted
profiles noncompliant with the website’s guidelines.93 The complaint indi-
cated that the website facilitated a matchup between two individuals, one
who misrepresented her age to be eighteen when in actuality she was four-
teen.94 The court extended the reasoning from Carafano v. Metrosplash
.com95 and Doe v. MySpace96 to assign immunity under Section 230 of the
CDA.
In both Dart and SexSearch, the courts utilized an overly broad interpre-
tation of immunity for interactive computer services without giving signifi-
cant credence to the nature of the websites in question and their eliciting of
dangerous and potentially illegal information and services.97 This tunnel vi-
sion begs consideration for change of either Section 230’s provision of im-
munity, or its subsequent interpretation by the courts. But, any direct change
would be piecemeal at best and would likely not address the broader issues
ICSPs face with fake news and misinformation, especially what does not
reach a criminal level. While Section 230 does address the necessity for curb-
89. Seaton, supra note 58, at 356–57.
90. See Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961, 967–69 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
91. See id. at 967.
92. See id. at 969 (distinguishing from the search function criticized in Roommates
.com which achieved illegal ends for its users).
93. See Doe v. SexSearch, 502 F. Supp. 2d 719, 725–26 (N.D. Ohio 2007), aff’d on
other grounds, 551 F.3d 412 (6th Cir. 2008).
94. Id. at 722.
95. See id. at 725–26 (citing Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119,
1123–25 (9th Cir. 2003)) (ruling that questionnaires provided to website users
are not enough to create the developer distinction for SexSearch).
96. See id. at 727–28 (citing Doe v. MySpace, Inc. (MySpace Inc. I), 474 F. Supp.
2d 843, 849–50 (W.D. Tex. 2007)) (holding that the allegation that SexSearch
is liable as a publisher due to its not monitoring the victim’s activity on the
website fails to defeat the claim of immunity under the CDA).
97. Seaton, supra note 58, at 369.
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ing criminal activity on the Internet,98 misinformation and subsequent defa-
mation claims lack a criminal nature, and thus do not create the same impetus
for change as the issues presented in Dart and SexSearch. The contemporary
policy focus of the CDA does not seek to remedy issues of fake news and
misinformation disseminated by social media intermediaries—alternative
policy considerations must occur to raise the importance of this inquiry.
B. Potential for Statutory Change
Statutory change for the CDA is unlikely without a major change in
Section 230’s judicial interpretation and applicability to ICSPs. Similar to the
genesis of the Internet, the continued development of ICSPs could present
novel legal issues for the courts to evaluate.99 If other courts adopt the broad-
ened definition of “content contributor” from Roommates.com and apply it to
social media ICSPs,100 a statutory response could occur similar to that fol-
lowing the Stratton case.101 But, contemporary technological advancement
does not necessitate an Internet free of tort liability—the threat of a chilling
on ICSP innovation carries less merit than at the time of the CDA’s pass-
ing.102 Courts could consider the current necessities of public policy, deter-
mine that expansive Section 230 immunity is no longer valid, and create
more accountability for the harmful content that circulates on various social
media websites. Policymakers would thus make a determination as to how
they will treat modern ICSPs—either with the same level of protection to
ensure self-regulation and a lack of government intrusion, or with more scru-
tiny toward the harmful content created and disseminated on their plat-
forms.103 Based on current social media trends, a new policy debate regarding
the validity and applicability of Section 230 immunity would surely include a
discussion regarding liability for fake news, misinformation, and other forms
of malicious social media content not currently punishable.
C. Legal Protections for Fake News and Misinformation
The First Amendment provides strong (but not absolute) protection for
the freedom of expression, as well as underpinning viewpoints, subject mat-
ter, and content of said expression.104 This constitutional safeguard precludes
98. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(5) (“It is the policy of the United States . . . to ensure
vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking
in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of computer.”).
99. See supra text accompanying notes 29–33.
100. See supra text accompanying note 65.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 43–46.
102. See supra text accompanying note 65; see infra Part IV.B.
103. See supra notes 66–70 and accompanying text.
104. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2543–44 (2012) (quoting Ashcroft v.
Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002)).
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any deterrent or chilling effect on the free interchange of ideas within the
political and social realms, including what makes up the Fourth and Fifth
Estates.105 The importance of this protection currently demands the presump-
tion of invalidity for content-based restrictions, and the burden is on the gov-
ernment to prove their constitutionality.106
The Supreme Court of the United States has long rejected any form of
ad hoc social balancing test to measure the strength of a particular aspect of
First Amendment coverage.107 Content-based restrictions on speech and pub-
lications become permissible when confined to categories long considered
valid by the Court and found in the historical foundation of the free speech
tradition.108 Advocacy intended to defame or disparage operates in this list of
exceptions, but absent is a general exception for knowingly false state-
ments.109 In a litany of cases, the Court expressed disdain for false statements
and their attempt to be included under the umbrella of First Amendment pro-
tection.110 For instance, the Court stated, “[f]alse statements . . . are particu-
larly valueless [because] they interfere with the truth-seeking function of the
marketplace of ideas . . . ,”111 and that they are not protected by the First
Amendment in the same caliber as truthful statements.112 As they appear in
discussions on First Amendment protections, the Court repeatedly discounted
the value of fake speech and expressions.113 But, the Court in United States v.
Alvarez refused to contextualize these former statements as a categorical re-
moval, or even dilution, of constitutional protection for false statements or
105. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (quoting Roth
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)); see supra Part II.A.
106. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2543–44 (quoting Ashcroft, 542 U.S. 656, 660).
107. Id. at 2544 (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010)); see
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271 (rejecting as a First Amendment exception any test of
truth to be administered by a court or jury, especially one that places the burden
of proof on the speaker).
108. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544 (quoting Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 2544–45.
111. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Farwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988).
112. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60–61 (1982); see Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2545.
113. See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 171 (1979) (“Spreading false infor-
mation in and of itself carries no First Amendment credentials.”); Va. Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)
(“Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its
own sake.”); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (“[T]here
is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.”); Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) (“[T]he knowingly false statement and the false state-
ment made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional
protection.”).
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misinformation.114 It narrowed the reduction or removal of First Amendment
protections for false speech and misinformation to instances involving defa-
mation, fraud, or some other legally cognizable harm associated with a false
statement.115 Further, even in those instances, falsity is not wholly determina-
tive in removing the speech from First Amendment protections; the speech
must be a knowing or reckless falsehood to be actionable.116 Limiting this
exception avoids a chilling effect on speech by encouraging uncertain speak-
ers or authors to make true—or ostensibly true—statements with a lower risk
of persecution.117
Government attempts at content-based regulation of speech, commercial
or otherwise, receive judicial review under a strict scrutiny standard.118
Under this standard, courts must consider content-based restrictions invalid,
and the government bears the burden of showing their constitutionality by
establishing a compelling government interest that outweighs the protected
individual interest.119 The Court in Alvarez applied this standard to determin-
ing if the Stolen Valor Act, a law proscribing false claims of receipt of mili-
tary decorations or medals, was unconstitutional.120 It held the act
unconstitutional under the First Amendment, because the government cannot
proscribe false statements solely because they are false.121 This particular fal-
sity did not fall within a predetermined category unprotected by the First
Amendment, nor was the Court presented with persuasive evidence that the
novel restriction on content was part of a long and recognized tradition of
proscription.122 This decision shows that even the worst forms of expressed
falsity will fall under the strict scrutiny standard for judicial review, thus
making direct statutory solutions extremely difficult.
114. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544–45.
115. Id. at 2545.
116. Id.; see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964) (barring
recovery for a defamation claim against a public official unless the statement
was made “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not.”).
117. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2545; Leslie Kendrick, Speech, Intent, and the Chil-
ling Effect, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1633, 1637 (2013).
118. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2543; Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622,
642 (1994) (“Our precedents thus apply the most exacting scrutiny to regula-
tions that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech
because of its content.”).
119. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2543–44.
120. Id. at 2539.
121. Id. at 2551 (“The Nation well knows that one of the costs of the First Amend-
ment is that it protects the speech we detest as well as the speech we
embrace.”).
122. Id. at 2547 (quoting Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Assn., 564 U.S. 786, 792 (2011)).
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In his concurring opinion in Alvarez, Justice Breyer advocated for a
flexible intermediate scrutiny standard for regulations of false speech.123 This
standard would permit the regulation of published false information that cre-
ates direct and indirect harm while avoiding the rigors of the strict scrutiny
standard typically deployed for content-based regulations.124 This approach
creates breathing room for the policy justifications of regulations on fake
news or misinformation, while at the same time protecting the values embod-
ied in the First Amendment protection of free expression.125 It could guide
lawmakers in creating legislation proscribing harmful false speech,126 pro-
vided the statutory remedy does not create a “disproportionate constitutional
harm.”127
The Court in Alvarez identified certain legal options to address claims
against false speech, including defamation, fraud, and criminal charges.128
The CDA also provides external remedies for problematic content on the
Internet not within the scope of Section 230 immunity.129 The nature of fake
news and misinformation circulated on the Internet, however, prevents a ho-
listic and direct remedy—even the most potent solution for news that seeks
to defame has limited recourse.130 The Court typically seeks to limit the ap-
plicability of laws that require an understanding of speaker intent, primarily
to avoid the chilling of speech from uncertain speakers who do not intend to
create a falsity or misinform.131 Because news and information on the In-
ternet carry the same First Amendment protections as that found in tradi-
tional print media, the current statutory and legal understanding of the First
Amendment and false information apply.132
123. Id. at 2551–52 (Breyer, J., concurring).
124. See id.
125. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2556 (Breyer, J., concurring).
126. See infra Part V.A.
127. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2556 (Breyer, J. concurring).
128. See supra text accompanying note 115.
129. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
130. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (prohibit-
ing a public official from recovering damages for defamation unless proof is
presented that the defaming statement was made with knowledge or reckless
disregard of its falsity).
131. See Kendrick, supra note 117, at 1648–49.
132. See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
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IV. COMPETING SOCIAL, LEGAL, AND ECONOMIC
CONSIDERATIONS
A. Social Media Intermediaries and Journalism
The stability of the Fourth and Fifth Estates relies on the quality of news
and information obtainable on the Internet.133 The legitimacy and quality of
information found in new technological mediums remains fundamental to
keeping society informed, as well as to maintaining the accountability of so-
cial, government, business, and industry forces.134 Contemporary news and
information still circulates through traditional forms of media, such as news-
papers and television media, but it also maintains its fluidity through In-
ternet-based outlets, with a large focus on social media websites.135 While a
symbiotic relationship often exists between entities of the Fourth and Fifth
Estates,136 a lack of growth and legitimacy in traditional Fourth Estate media
may create a shift, in both investment and overall attention, away from these
news sources.137
Social media intermediaries and third-party journalists are forever mar-
ried, and thus, the decline of one would invariably implicate the other. While
users and providers of valid information in the Fifth Estate operate indepen-
dently of any single institution, they typically originate from the Fourth Es-
tate.138 A solution to the issue of fake news and misinformation would have
to ensure the survival of both forces; it must foster beneficial forms of jour-
nalism and improve the intermediaries that invest in the spreading of said
journalism.139
Ideally, accountability for the spread of fake news and misinformation
could lie directly with the ICSPs that facilitate content dissemination. But,
social media intermediaries refuse this accountability and avoid the title of
“media company” or “news provider.”140 By doing so, they receive benefits
of media membership while also maintaining immunity as ICSPs under Sec-
133. See Newman et al., supra note 7, at 7.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See id. (discussing the ability for Fifth Estate networking to fill in the informa-
tional gaps left by traditional Fourth Estate media, thus allowing for both forces
to be bolstered).
137. See Schlosberg, supra note 14, at 8 (noting the trend of investment moving
from former news investigators to social media intermediaries).
138. See Newman et al., supra note 7, at 7.
139. See Schlosberg, supra note 14, at 6 (discussing the cross-subsidy of profes-
sional news through promoting public interest journalism and having the mod-
ern technological vehicles of delivery bid for investment).
140. See Buni, supra note 4 (discussing Facebook and Google’s avoidance of the
“media company” label).
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tion 230 of the CDA.141 Larger social media intermediaries have taken margi-
nal steps to address these issues without fully committing to the solution. For
instance, Google announced the permanent ban of 200 advertisers—out of
nearly two million—from its AdSense advertising network due to deceiving
users with their online ad services.142 In November, Facebook updated its
policy language, which already stated it would not display ads from websites
showing misleading content, to include fake news websites.143 Both compa-
nies announced in early 2017 a push for the use of fact-checking tools in
Germany and France to root out fake news stories ahead of the elections in
each country.144 For instance, if a user reports a story as false or misinform-
ing, a third party, independent fact-checking organization based in Berlin
will examine it and determine its reliability.145 Users may still share stories
flagged as “disputed,” but with a warning disputing the validity of the
story.146 More recently, Facebook announced its decision to hand over to
Congress 3,000 Russia-linked ads used on the social media site during the
2016 presidential campaign,147 reflecting a continued acknowledgment of its
relation to the false news phenomenon.148 While these actions ostensibly
seem like a substantial improvement, the companies will likely refrain from
limiting or removing content on their own, or else risk losing their neutral-
ity.149 The social media intermediaries must confront the moral obligations
packaged with their massive global influence, while also avoiding claims of
censorship to maintain their neutrality and immunity.150 While these steps
may approach a solution, the hesitance to make full strides remains clear;
141. See id.
142. Wakabayashi & Issac, supra note 4.
143. Id.
144. Federico Guerrini, Facebook Will Flag and Filter Fake News in Germany,
FORBES (Jan. 16, 2017, 5:33 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/federicoguer-
rini/2017/01/16/facebook-will-flag-and-filter-fake-news-in-germany/#60ea991
060e3; Gwenaelle Barzic & Sudip Kar-Gupta, Facebook, Google Join Drive
Against Fake News in France, REUTERS (Feb. 6, 2017, 2:40 AM), http://www
.reuters.com/article/us-france-election-facebook-idUSKBN15L0QU.
145. Guerrini, supra note 144.
146. Id.
147. Mike Isaac & Scott Shane, Facebook to Deliver 3,000 Russia-Linked Ads to
Congress on Monday, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/10/01/technology/facebook-russia-ads.html.
148. See Andre Spicer, Why Facebook’s About-Face on Russia Ads?, CNN (Sept.
22, 2017, 6:18 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/22/opinions/facebook-adver-
tisements-russia-spicer-opinion/index.html.
149. See supra notes 60–62 and accompanying text.
150. Mike Isaac, Facebook Mounts Effort to Limit Tide of Fake News, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/15/technology/facebook-
fake-news.html.
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thus, judicial solutions, as well as indirect policy solutions, require
consideration.
B. Tort Liability for Interactive Service Providers
The “specter of tort liability” remains the largest perceived threat by
ICSPs of any new reshaping or reduction of Section 230 immunity by the
CDA.151 Congress considered the imposition of tort liability on digital or
social media intermediaries based on the communications of third parties to
be an intrusive government regulation of speech.152 Further, Congress as-
sumed the worst from a potential response from ICSPs to a potential hike in
regulation; particularly, they worried providers would severely limit or re-
strict the quality and quantity of communications circulated on their web-
sites, thereby quashing true diversity of social and political discourse.153 But,
as the Ninth Circuit in Roommates.com stresses, “The Internet is no longer a
fragile new means of communication that can be easily smothered . . . by
overzealous . . . laws and regulations.”154 Social media intermediaries and
other ICSPs remain a dominant force, socially and economically, in markets
for communications and commerce.155 To use legislative intent from the ad-
vent of Section 230 of the CDA to justify the lack of advancement in regulat-
ing online fake news and misinformation is to ignore the ever-rising
juggernaut of social media intermediaries and their political, cultural, and
social influence.
Assuming arguendo that the specter of immense tort liability remains
over ICSPs without Section 230 immunity, alternative judicial and policy
solutions exist to stymie this concern and still work toward an improved In-
ternet marketplace of ideas. First, a judicial reimagining of reviewing statutes
targeting false speech may permit new legislation that strikes a careful bal-
ance between limiting blatant fake news and misinformation and promoting
self-regulation of social media intermediaries without a heightened risk of
liability.156 Second, a cross-subsidization of effective, nonpartisan journalism
avoids intersecting with the qualifications of Section 230 immunity.157 This
policy proposal addresses the concerns facing journalistic integrity within the
Fourth and Fifth Estates without seeking a reduction in liability protection for
interactive service providers.158 These alternatives establish stronger answers
151. See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330–31 (4th Cir. 1997).
152. See id.
153. See id. at 330–331.
154. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d
1157, 1164 n.15 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
155. See id.; see infra Part V.B.
156. See Zeran, 129 F.3d 327 at 330; infra text accompanying notes 193–96.
157. See infra text accompanying notes 234–38.
158. See infra text accompanying notes 236–38.
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to the issue of fake news and misinformation through indirect means—the
judicial solution creates a new framework for a statutory response, and the
policy solution externally funds new media to counteract harmful media.
Thus, the consequence of excessive tort liability on social media in-
termediaries, regardless of validity, remains in consideration when address-
ing possible solutions to fake news and misinformation.
V. ALTERNATIVES
A. Judicial Application of an Intermediate Scrutiny Standard
Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in United States v. Alvarez provides
a guiding light to legislators seeking to stymie the Internet dissemination of
harmful fake news and misinformation.159 The concurring opinion advocates
for an intermediate scrutiny approach to evaluating statutes that seek to curb
unambiguous falsehoods in public circulation.160 More generally, this stan-
dard applies in instances where an author blatantly falsifies public speech, or
when false speech runs contrary to easily verifiable information.161 Rather
than meet the exacting strict scrutiny required of most free speech regula-
tions,162 the intermediate scrutiny approach provides more flexibility in con-
structing statutes that target unambiguously false Internet speech, while also
preserving speech valued by First Amendment jurisprudence.163 While inevi-
tably there are instances where the First Amendment need protect false
speech,164 situations where the harm of false speech substantially outweighs
its benefit to the marketplace of ideas permits a more generous approach.165
Justice Breyer’s intermediate scrutiny approach employs a balancing
test consisting of three factors: (1) harmfulness of targeted speech; (2) the
potential constitutional harm in the regulation of the targeted speech; and (3)
the mitigating effects of counterspeech.166 While individual judges may
weigh these factors differently against each other, this approach identifies the
159. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2551–56 (2012) (Breyer, J., concur-
ring); Jeffrey C. Barnum, Encouraging Congress to Encourage Speech: Reflec-
tions on United States v. Alvarez, 76 ALB. L. REV. 527, 535 (2013).
160. For a summary of this decision, see supra Part III.C.
161. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2552 (Breyer, J., concurring).
162. See id.; Barnum, supra note 159, at 535.
163. See Barnum, supra note 159, at 543, 546–47.
164. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2564 (Alito, J., dissenting) (discussing instances
where purportedly false speech may benefit public debate and how its whole-
sale proscription could lead to an abuse of government power).
165. Id. at 2552 (Breyer, J., concurring).
166. See id. at 2553–56 (Breyer, J., concurring) (identifying justifications for regu-
lating certain strains of speech, but cautioning against causing constitutional
harm); Barnum, supra note 159, at 535–36 (crystallizing the main aspects of
Justice Breyer’s intermediate scrutiny balancing test).
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core balancing variables necessary to establish a judicial decision.167 This
approach permits a proper response to statutes that adversely affect constitu-
tionally protected interests, but do not trigger near-immediate rejection nor
near-automatic approval (or, stated differently, neither strict scrutiny nor ra-
tional basis review, respectively).168
Statutes constricting free speech require a limiting principle to prevent
an overreach of government power and the discouraging of valuable dis-
course.169 The Court in Alvarez sought to contextualize false speech by its
cognizable harm, rather than its potential benefit, to determine the necessity
of its potential regulation.170 This intermediate scrutiny approach measures
the harmfulness of speech and the probability of its occurrence in contextu-
ally specific instances to determine how it balances against the risk of consti-
tutional harm.171 Potential harm from false speech occurs in one of two ways:
(1) direct harm, where a speaker of false speech directly targets a victim or
damaged party; or (2) indirect harm, where the speaker does not directly
target the victim, but nonetheless causes the victim harm.172 Establishing the
direct harm from fake news would likely prove difficult on a broad scale,
given the fluctuating nature of purportedly fraudulent content and its dissem-
ination throughout various social media intermediaries. As a result, any stat-
ute seeking to proscribe the source of the purported harm would likely fail to
survive under the intermediate scrutiny standard.173
Fake news and misinformation may indirectly harm a party, even if said
harm is incidental.174 Justice Breyer draws an analogy to statutes prohibiting
trademark infringement that require a showing of actual confusion, which
assures the high likeliness that a harm will occur.175 Similarly, a statute regu-
lating knowingly fake news or misinformation may identify physical harm,
emotional distress, or a comparable harm as what fake news could create.
167. Barnum, supra note 159, at 535–36.
168. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2552 (Breyer, J., concurring).
169. See id. at 2555.
170. See id. at 2547 (plurality opinion); see id. at 2555 (Breyer, J., concurring)
(“[L]imitations of context, requirements of proof, and the like, narrow the stat-
ute to a subset of lies where specific harm is more likely to occur.”).
171. See id. at 2555; Barnum, supra note 159, at 535.
172. Barnum, supra note 159, at 537; see Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2553–54 (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
173. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2555 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting the requirement
of a statutory regulation on speech to establish its narrowed scope through
clearly defined proof of context and injury).
174. Barnum, supra note 159, at 540; see Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2549 (plurality
opinion) (noting the indirect harms of falsely claiming possession of military
awards).
175. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2554 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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The challenge for creating this statute would be the specific identification of
a harm that falls outside what is already actionable, such as defamation.
Without this particular limiting principle, the potential for constitutional
harm from a regulation of free speech would substantially outweigh the lim-
ited harm deterred by the statute.176
In order to pass muster under Justice Breyer’s intermediate scrutiny
standard, statutes seeking to regulate fake news and misinformation must not
create “disproportionate constitutional harm.”177 Statutes create significant
First Amendment tumult when their regulation of free speech and press expe-
rience overbreadth, vagueness, selective enforcement, or engage in view-
point-discrimination.178 A well-tailored regulatory statute targeting false
speech establishes constitutional muster under this approach when it identi-
fies material, specific harm in narrowly construed contexts, and when it re-
quires specific knowledge of falsity by the author or publisher to be
actionable.179 To avoid a degradation of the First Amendment’s legitimacy,
the constitutional harm element carries significant weight when the speech in
question falls into contexts that usually call for strict scrutiny protection,
such as religion, history, and the social sciences.180 In contrast, these con-
cerns carry less weight when statutory regulations maintain “slight social
value” and do not maintain high priority of First Amendment values.181 A
statute that highlights the lesser constitutional value of fake news and misin-
formation, while also narrowly construing permissible regulation of said
speech, holds the strongest chance of overcoming disproportionate constitu-
tional harm.182
The First Amendment requires a statutory restriction on speech at issue
be “actually necessary” to achieve its interest.183 This necessity requirement
includes a showing that counterspeech, a natural or artificial means of refut-
ing harmful speech, would not suffice to achieve the government interest.184
The government maintains the responsibility to either create their own
176. See id. at 2555.
177. Id. at 2556.
178. See id. at 2551–56 (discussing First Amendment risks prevalent in statutes aim-
ing to prohibit false factual statements).
179. See id. at 2555–56.
180. Id. at 2552.
181. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2552 (Breyer, J., concurring); Barnum, supra note
159, at 542 (first citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1942); then citing Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011)).
182. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2555–56 (Breyer, J., concurring).
183. Id. at 2549 (plurality opinion) (citing Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Assn., 564 U.S.
786, 798 (2011)).
184. See id. at 2550 (requiring a showing that the dynamics of free speech and refu-
tation through counter speech cannot overcome false speech).
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counterspeech measures, or identify the natural means of counterspeech aris-
ing in a particular context, and show why they unsuccessfully or insuffi-
ciently deal with the problematic false speech.185 Under Justice Breyer’s
intermediate scrutiny approach, a showing of effective counterspeech dilutes
the harmfulness of the targeted speech, so proving the inadequacy of counter-
speech against specific harmful speech legitimizes the constitutionality of a
responsive statute.186 Further, this approach measures the mitigating effect of
counterspeech by the subject matter being regulated—fake news and misin-
formation—and the harm targeted by the statute—here, the quality and repu-
tation of the marketplace of ideas.187
Tedious attempts to respond to the breadth of fake news on the Internet
prevents a government-created means of counterspeech from adequately
overcoming the targeted harmfulness. The impossibility of a general, but ef-
fective, remedy to fake news shifts the responsibility of an effective response
onto natural counterspeech.188 But, the public lacks the ability to completely
identify fake news and eradicate it from the marketplace of ideas. Methods of
fact checking from sources of traditional media and third party, independent
verification fall short of distinguishing real news from fake news.189 Further,
roadblocks (some self-imposed) impede social media intermediaries from
curbing the dissemination of fake news on the Internet.190 Social media in-
termediaries lack the willpower to eradicate fake news and misinformation
on their websites primarily to maintain immunity under the CDA191 and to
maintain the “technology company” label.192 Legislators creating a statute
must stress the public’s inability to curb fake news on their own accord to
show how statutes must mitigate fake news’s harmfulness.
If the Supreme Court were to adopt this intermediate scrutiny standard,
any statute seeking to regulate fake news and misinformation on the Internet
must comport with the above described factors. Additionally, a constitution-
185. See id.; Barnum, supra note 159, at 544.
186. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2555–56 (Breyer, J., concurring); Barnum, supra
note 159, at 535, 544–45. But see Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2551–52 (plurality
opinion).
187. See Barnum, supra note 159, at 544.
188. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2550 (plurality opinion) (discussing the variety of
possible responses to public false claims of military honors, such as through
press coverage and social media responsiveness).
189. See, e.g., Brooke Borel, Fact-Checking Won’t Save Us from Fake News,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Jan. 4, 2017), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/fact-
checking-wont-save-us-from-fake-news (noting the increasing difficulty for
traditional media outlets and other sources of information to debunk fake news
stories, especially within more partisan topics.
190. See id.
191. See generally supra Part II.C.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 140–41.
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ally compliant statute should coincide with the goals of the CDA to promote
self-regulation and effective provision of services from ICSPs.193 An amend-
ment to the CDA—or an entirely new piece of legislation—must work with
ICSPs to establish new standards for content permissible on social media
websites. This process cannot deter valuable speech lacking the same charac-
ter of harm narrowly construed by the intermediate scrutiny standard.194 Fur-
ther, the overall goal of this type of statute should not be the complete
override of social media intermediaries; rather, creating a more compelling
incentive for ICSPs to better self-regulate harmful content without risking the
loss of Section 230 immunity, and to avoid immediate government interven-
tion into harmful speech.195 This alternative promotes a healthier marketplace
of ideas without mandating that Facebook, Google, and other social media
intermediaries completely redesign their operability.196
The adoption of an intermediate scrutiny standard for review of statutes
regulating fake news and misinformation reimagines the constitutional view
on free speech and the marketplace of ideas. This standard sustains the First
Amendment’s promotion of free speech and reduces the potency of a deter-
rent on activity within the marketplace of ideas through its requirements for a
narrowly tailored harm from particular speech, and a showing of the insuffi-
ciency of counterspeech to resolve the particularized harm.197 Extensive pol-
icy consideration needs to go into a potential response to the Internet fake
news epidemic, as it must balance the public’s need for a healthy market-
place of ideas with social media intermediaries’ necessity for immunity to
ensure technological growth, while also meeting the demands of this poten-
tial new First Amendment standard.
B. Creation of a Journalism Cross-Subsidy
The difficulty in establishing direct liability for the dissemination of
fake news and misinformation justifies examining alternative means of re-
storing the Fourth and Fifth Estates. The Centre for Media Transparency,
partnered with The ResPublica Trust, an independent non-partisan think tank,
proposes a nominal levy on the revenues of Internet news intermediaries that
possess significant monopoly market power in online search and social
networking markets.198 While the proposal does not identify a specific taxa-
ble percentage, it does discuss the potential outcomes from a one percent tax,
193. See supra text accompanying notes 44–47.
194. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 47–50.
196. See Buni, supra note 4 (discussing social media intermediaries’ lack of willing-
ness to take full responsibility for the harmful content shared on their respec-
tive websites).
197. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
198. Schlosberg, supra note 14, at 3.
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giving some context to its understanding of “nominal.”199 The proposal advo-
cates for the tax proceeds to fund particular forms of local and long-form
public interest journalism valuable to, and endangered in, the media ecosys-
tem.200 This functionally operates as a cross-subsidy to assist in counteracting
the harmful impact of fake news and misinformation on the Internet, and to
place accountability on the intermediaries that disseminate said harmful
content.201
The original context and justification for this levy was to promote jour-
nalistic plurality at the local level, and to work against the stagnation of pub-
lic interest journalism caused by mass media concentration.202 There is a
public interest in sustaining local and long-form journalism, and the levy
proposal effectively supports these news sources via the cross-subsidized re-
sources of large-scale Internet intermediaries, such as Google and
Facebook.203 The revenues reallocated by this proposal stem from advertisers
that once supported publishers of valuable long-form public interest journal-
ism, so the proposal would not operate as a radical shift in media market
resources.204 While the original proposal from the Centre for Media Trans-
parency primarily focuses on permitting new entrants into the media market
and diluting the monopoly power held by large-scale Internet in-
termediaries,205 an ancillary goal of the proposal is an efficient reallocation of
resources necessary to counteract detrimental journalism and preserve the
Fourth and Fifth Estate.
Despite the conception of ostensible journalistic independence in the
United States created by the First Amendment and permissible dissent from
government narratives, historically, a mixed system of private enterprise and
public support forms the foundation of American journalism.206 While adver-
tising makes up the broad majority of revenues for modern news media, the
government heavily subsidized the news market through the early 20th cen-
tury through such means as printing and postal subsidies.207 Publicly funded
199. See id. at 8.
200. Id. at 6.
201. See id.
202. See id. at 4–6.
203. See id.
204. See Schlosberg, supra note 14, at 7–8.
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journalism contributes to this mixed system, as seen with non-profit journal-
ism from the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) and National Public Radio
(NPR).208 State support does not per se lead to impermissible control—sys-
tems of peer review for grant making, along with independence instilled by
the First Amendment, wards off the most problematic concerns of govern-
ment censorship or regulation of information.209 International publicly funded
journalism, such as the BBC and BBC World Services, shows high levels of
success while maintaining their global presence courtesy of British citizens
who pay into a public funding structure and operating under a set of profes-
sional norms that protect their editorial freedom.210 In the United States, con-
cerns for the First Amendment requires a public funding structure to
invigorate beneficial public journalism without excessive control over the
subsequently generated news and media.211 Successful and enlightened poli-
cymaking must not sacrifice the autonomy of the Fourth and Fifth Estates;
thus, a policy of reorienting resources to invigorate the marketplace of ideas
must occur within a mixed and balanced system.212
A cross-subsidy benefitting public interest journalism responds directly
to an ongoing crisis within the Fourth Estate. Journalism facilitated by news-
papers and local media sources are weakening while partisan broadcast and
Internet media outlets continue to gain traction and profitability through dis-
seminating distorted and misleading information.213 Local and long-form
public interest journalism face the largest risk of dying out with the contin-
ued digital transition of newspapers, and the subsequent shift in their cost
base and prioritization of content.214 The shift in investor confidence in tradi-
tional news media contributes to this decline—the decreasing market value
of local newspaper companies forces investors to look to large-scale Internet
intermediaries for better profitability.215 Within the realm of digital media,
208. See Christopher Hooton, Donald Trump Set to ‘Eliminate Arts Funding Pro-
grams’, INDEPENDENT (Jan. 20, 2017), http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-en-
tertainment/donald-trump-budget-cuts-arts-humanities-nea-neh-npr-cbs-
president-a7536741.html. These programs are currently at risk of losing ap-
proximately $445.5 million a year from the government with the Trump Ad-
ministration’s proposal to privatize the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. Id.
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new websites such as Buzzfeed and the Huffington Post attempt meaningful
contributions to long-form journalism, but their entry lacks the traction nec-
essary to make a significant impact.216 In addition, sources of news receiving
public funding, such as PBS and NPR, are currently at risk of elimination,
furthering the concern for a lack of variety of quality national journalism.217
Local news in the United States receives focus in the local television indus-
try, but these news sources often lack coverage meaningful to the Fourth
Estate; instead, their coverage is often “inadequate, episodic, and superficial
– and rarely genuinely local.”218 This remains particularly troubling given
that over half of the country primarily relies on local media for news and
information about the government, elections, and other relevant matters in
current events.219 The risk to particular forms of beneficial journalism, both
at the local and national levels, worsens exponentially when resources flow
to Internet intermediaries that promulgate information counterproductive to
the growth of the Fourth and Fifth Estates.220 A new policy of cross-subsi-
dized public interest journalism may help to re-establish the legitimacy of the
Estates and rejuvenate the marketplace of ideas.
As stated above, the cross-subsidy proposal requires a balance of pro-
moting effective, public interest journalism without the consequences of gov-
ernment control. The goal of this proposal is the creation of stronger
accountability from large-scale Internet intermediaries permitting the spread
of fake news and misinformation. Because these intermediaries reject the
news media company label, a new policy must indirectly ascertain responsi-
bility.221 This process of cross-subsidizing public interest journalism would
have minimal impact on the viability of companies such as Facebook and
Google.222 The reallocated resources originally applied to these targeted me-
dia markets, and the intermediaries’ overall bottom line would remain un-
scathed compared to the large upswing garnered by the beneficiary of the
proposal.223 Accountability from large-scale search engines and social
networking websites matters because of the websites’ function as technology
intermediaries operating as platforms in two-sided markets.224 An intermedi-
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ary platform creates a website or service available to public users, which
make up the audience for advertisers, which provides revenue to the interme-
diary.225 Google operates as a search engine platform for its users to find
information disseminated by various advertisers, and Facebook provides a
platform for social exchange that exposes users to tailored advertisements.226
Google and Facebook disseminate web-based media in a mutually beneficial
way: the higher user bases for their platforms directly implicate the popular-
ity of a particular strain of media or advertisements, and in return, the plat-
forms obtain revenue from these sources necessary to operate effectively.227
In a similar fashion, these intermediaries connect users with providers of
news and information, thereby establishing a foundational element of the
Fifth Estate.228 This function justifies the cross-subsidy focus on search en-
gine and social media platforms; it can be both a cause of and remedy for the
issues presented by fake news and misinformation disseminated on the
Internet.
The cross-subsidy proposal from the Centre for Media Transparency
discusses a tax on online search and social media intermediaries that main-
tain at least a 25% market share of their respective markets.229 Limited par-
ticipants with high individual market shares make up the bulk of these
markets.230 In particular, Google maintains over an 80% market share for the
online search engine market, and it has kept this level consistent since
2008.231 Since 2010, Facebook has maintained above 40% market share in
the Internet social media market, thus consistently outpacing other in-
termediaries such as YouTube, Twitter, and Reddit.232 Thus, based on market
share reports from 2016, adopting the Centre for Media Transparency propo-
sal of a nominal tax on intermediaries with a 25% monopoly market share
would only affect Google and Facebook.233 Intermediaries’ market strength
limits the negative consequences of the cross-subsidy, as the taxed amount
would be nominal compared to the intermediaries’ overall yearly revenue.234
Based on estimated reported annual revenues for Google and Facebook in
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2016, a one percent tax would generate approximately $1.17 billion.235 This
taxable percentage can change based on the needs of the programs receiving
funds from the cross-subsidy, as well as the health of the targeted intermedi-
ary markets. Financially the cross-subsidy would not be a significant burden
on these companies, as they continue to demonstrate their capacity to avoid
full corporate taxation by redirecting profits to other jurisdictions away from
their point of generation.236
This cross-subsidy would ensure that these corporations make a mean-
ingful contribution to the public through stimulating beneficial journalism
and the Fourth Estate as a whole. The cross-subsidy is a less invasive means
of working toward improving Internet-based journalism. Rather than impos-
ing a direct regulation or set of proscriptions on technological intermediaries,
the cross-subsidy would operate externally to keep these companies incen-
tivized to self-regulate their own content and maintain Section 230 immunity
offered by the CDA.237 Further, it would avoid the need for major policy or
judicial overhauls required by a direct solution to fake news and misinforma-
tion.238 An indirect solution prevents the need for reimagining statutory or
judicial approaches to speech and content regulation, while simultaneously
maintaining the structural integrity of technological intermediaries.
While public subsidies for journalism are structurally important for its
continued societal benefits, the primary concern remains the First Amend-
ment obligation to preserve an independent free press.239 The direct provision
of resources needed to populate beneficial journalism inevitably leads to the
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government evaluating journalism content qualitatively, which may result in
authoritarian or totalitarian outcomes.240 But, other nations consistently out-
spend the United States in public journalism subsidies without seeing severe
consequences for their rates of freedom and democracy.241 Ostensibly, it is
possible to maintain a free and independent press while also publicly funding
its continued operation, but concerns still arise as to the determination of how
to disperse the funds generated from the proposed cross-subsidy. As previ-
ously stated, the goal of the proposal must be the improvement of public
journalism without the specter of government control of content.242 The Cen-
tre for Media Transparency suggests the use of an independent media board
to determine how to redirect funds to different forms of journalism and vari-
ous media outlets.243 An independent board can operate with the principle of
arms-length funding to avoid government interference with what forms of
news writing or media outlets obtain funding.244 This would also ensure that
all forms of journalism, and the respective social platforms reflected in their
content, obtain representation by this proposal.245 In prioritizing particular
forms of journalism to receive funds, rather than specific platforms or
messages, the cross-subsidy’s availability opens up to a diverse set of outlets
and styles for journalism, such as public interest, long-form, or investiga-
tive.246 This diversity ensures a lack of favoritism for the new government
subsidy, thus maintaining the integrity of the free press protected by the First
Amendment.
VI. CONCLUSION
The advent of the Internet and subsequent protections for interactive
service providers sought to cultivate a new means of global communication
and commerce without intrusive government regulation.247 The unfettered
and unregulated development of Internet free speech and e-commerce desired
by the Communications Decency Act likely did not predict the harmful
spread of fake news and misinformation through popular social media in-
termediaries.248 With this contemporary trend, new judicial and policy solu-
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tions require consideration to maintain journalistic integrity within the Fourth
and Fifth Estates. A reimagining of the standard of review used to evaluate
statutes regulating Internet can establish a framework for new legislation that
can regulate fake news and misinformation on social media intermediaries
without risking the loss of their Section 230 immunity provided by the CDA.
Alternatively, a cross-subsidy funding public, non-partisan journalism by
large digital intermediary resources is an external solution to ensure contin-
ued quality journalism while also keeping accountability for large social me-
dia intermediaries that disseminate fake news and misinformation.
In the short-term, these alternatives could play an essential role in scal-
ing back a trend of fake news on websites such as Facebook and Twitter.
This harmful misinformation plays a role in shaping social and political
events globally; thus, its impact deserves prioritization and focus from indus-
try and government leadership.249 The long-term implications broaden to the
overall future of journalism. The future of the Fourth Estate relies heavily on
the public’s confidence in the news, so the risk of the line blurring between
fake and legitimate information threatens the stability of traditional journal-
ism. Cross-subsidizing public, non-partisan journalism is a step in the right
direction, as it creates a new source of valuable, independent journalism
while maintaining the involvement and accountability of social media in-
termediaries.250 This external policy solution benefits the Fourth Estate by
reinvigorating traditional journalism through public interest stories not influ-
enced by partisan or industry interests, and the Fifth Estate benefits by circu-
lating beneficial news and information influenced by the reinvigorated
Fourth Estate journalism.251 The long-term health of traditional journalism,
along with its tangential influences on Fifth Estate Internet communications,
depends on a solution that values quality news and information and the ad-
vancement of digital intermediaries that disseminate the information.
As of late, the understanding of the term “fake news” shifts colloquially
on a rapid basis. Most recently, the public occasionally perceives the term to
identify information that dissents from subjective truth, rather than what is
recklessly or knowingly false.252 Despite this fluidity in understanding, the
stymying of fake news and misinformation disseminated through social me-
dia intermediaries remains critically important, or we risk a long-term decline
in the quality of the marketplace of ideas. Critical dissent and agonistic plu-
ralism carry upmost value in social and political discourse; blatant falsehoods
merely denigrate the value of that discourse.
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